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Summary findings
Using new international data, Hettige, Mani, and  water pollution rises rapidly through  middle-income
Wheeler test for an inverse U-shaped, or "Kuznets,"  status and remains roughly constant thereafter.
relationship between industrial water pollution  and  To explore the implications of their findings, the
economic development. They measure the effect of  authors simulate recent trends in industrial water
income growth on three proximate determinants of  pollution for industrial economies in the OECD, the
pollution: the share of manufacturing in total output, the  newly industrialized countries, Asian developing
sectoral composition of manufacturing, and the intensity  countries, and ex-COMECON economies. They find
(per unit of output) of industrial pollution at the "end of  roughly stable emissions in the OECD and ex-
pipe."  COMECON economies, moderate increases in the newly
They find that the manufacturing share of output  industrialized countries, and rapidly growing pollution in
follows a Kuznets-type trajectory, but the other two  the Asian developing countries.
determinants do not.  Their estimates for the 1980s suggest that Asian
Sectoral composition gets "cleaner" through middle-  developing countries displaced the OECD economies as
income status and then stabilizes.  the greatest generators of industrial water pollution.
At the end of pipe, pollution intensity declines strongly  Generally, however, the negative feedback from
with income. The authors  attribute this partly to stricter  economic development to pollution intensity was
regulation as income increases and partly to pollution-  sufficien- to hold total world pollution growth to about
labor complementarity in production.  15 percent over the 12-year sample period.
When they combine the three relationships, they do
not find a Kuznets relationship. Instead, total industrial
This paper - a product of the Development Research Group - is parr of a larger effort in the group to understand the
economics of industrial pollution control in developing countries. The study was funded by the Research Support Budget
under the research project "The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control in Developing Countries" (RPO 680-20). Copies
of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact David
Wheeler, room MC2-529,  telephone 202-473-3401,  fax 202-522-3230,  Internet  address dwheelerl@worldbank.org.
January 1998.  (36 pages)
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A number of recent studies have explored the relationship between economic development
and environmental quality.  Theoretical papers by Gruver (1976), John and Pecchenino (1992),
and Seldon and Song (1995) have derived transition paths for pollution, abatement effort and
development under alternative assumptions about social welfare functions, pollution damage, the
cost of abatement, and the productivity of capital.  Empirical studies (Hettige, et. al. (1992),
Shafik (1994), Seldon and Song (1994) and Grossman and Krueger (1995)) have searched for
systematic relationships by regressing cross-country measures of ambient air and water quality on
various polynomial  specifications of income per capita. This extensive body of work has been
motivated by several related questions:  Does pollution follow a 'Kuznets' curve, first rising and
then falling as income increases?  At what income level does the turnaround occur?  Do all
pollutants follow the same trajectory?  Is pollution reduction in developed economies due
primarily  to structural change, or to regulation?
The theoretical work has shown that a Kuznets, or inverted-U, relationship can result if a few
plausible conditions are satisfied as income increases: Constant or falling marginal utility of
consumption; rising marginal disutility of pollution; constant or rising marginal pollution damage;
and rising marginal abatement cost.  Of course, actual turnaround points depend on the relative
magnitudes of the underlying parameters, as well as their signs. Although they are not  explicitly
captured by the theoretical models, structural change in the economy and more effective
regulation are also potentially-important sources of change in pollution.
The empirical results are roughly consistent with a Kuznets curve for conventional air
pollutants such as suspended particulates and sulphur dioxide, but the results for water pollution
are mixed. In most cases, however, the implied  trajectories are sensitive to inclusion of higher-
1order polynomial  terms in income whose significance  varies widely. Structural interpretation of
the estimates remains ad hoc, since the existing studies have incorporated almost no evidence
about actual emissions in developing countries.'
This paper attempts to advance the state of the art, using new data on industrial water
emissions in developed and developing countries.  Our analysis  decomposes total industrial
pollution into four proximate determinants: National output; the share of industry in national
output; the share of polluting sectors in industrial output; and end-of-pipe pollution intensities in
the polluting sectors.  As most of the previously-cited work has noted (without being able to
resolve the issue), declining  pollution at higher levels of development must be driven by some
combination of income-related changes in the latter three factors.
We investigate these changes in three econometric exercises. Using international panel data,
we estimate the effects of economic development on industry's share of total output and the
industry share of polluting sectors.  To study development-related changes in end-of-pipe
pollution intensity, we have collected factory-level data on industrial water pollution from national
and regional environmental protection agencies (EPA's) in twelve countries:  Brazil, China,
Finland, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan (China),
Thailand and the US.  Controlling for sectoral differences, we use these data to investigate the
effects of income per capita, regulatory strictness and relative input prices on factory-level
pollution intensity (pollution/output).  In a complementary exercise, we add a measure of
regulatory strictness to a cross-country labor intensity equation to test for the impact of regulation
'A partial  exception  is the  work  of Seldon  and Song  (1994),  whose  regressions  employ  air emissions  instead  of
ambient  air  quality  measures.  The  lack  of  monitoring  information  forces  the  authors  to estimate  air
emissions  from  secondary  sources:  National  fuel  use  data  and fuel-based  pollution  parameters  which  are
adjusted  for  conditions  in countries  at varying  income  levels.  Data  scarcity  in developing  countries  is clearly
2on the demand  for labor.  For our international  pollution  accounting  exercise,  these results
provide  two inputs: A measure  of average  water pollution  intensity  for each  industry  sector (an
input  to our study of income-related  changes  in polluting  sectors),  and an estimate  of the change
in sectoral  pollution  intensities  as income  per capita  increases.
We combine  our econometric  results  to simulate  the total effect  of economic  development  on
industrial  water  pollution. In this  case, we do not find  an overall  inverse  U-shaped  relationship.
The three factors  have  very different  relationships  with income,  and  their  joint product with  total
output is asymptotic,  not parabolic. Industrial  water emissions  rise  until countries  attain middle-
income  status,  and then  remain  approximately  constant  as they grow  richer.
YWhile  our results  do not support  the Kuznets  hypothesis  for industrial  water pollution,  they
do reveal  a striking  regularity  in cross-country  environmental  performance.  Our plant-level
results suggest  that pollution  and labor  intensities  with respect  to output decline  continuously,  and
at almost  exactly  the same  rate, as income  increases. Thus,  sectoralpollution/labor  ratios remain
approximately  constant  during  the development  process.  This  finding  provides  useful  leverage
for  the analysis  of pollution  trends  across  countries  and over time. As an illustration,  we combine
our estimated  sectoral  pollution/labor  ratios  with panel  data on sectoral  employment  to simulate
international  trends in industrial  water pollution  during  the past two decades.
The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follows. Section  2 develops  the models  which
link our three pollution  factors  to economic  development.  Section  3 introduces  the data used for
estimation. Section  4 discusses  the results  and their implications,  while  Section  5 provides
a problem  for this exercise. Of thirty  countries  in the estimation  sample  only  four (China, India, Thailand,
Turkey)  are LDC's.
3illustrative  estimates  of recent water  pollution  trends  in a number  of developed  and  developing
countries. Section  6 concludes  the paper.
2.  DEVELOPMENT  AND INDUSTRIAL  POLLUTION
The first stages of economic  development  typically  witness  the rapid  growth of industrial
activity  and declining  environmental  quality  in densely-populated  urban  areas.  When  new
industries  are pollution-intensive,  their emissions  can increase  local ambient  pollutant
concentrations  to harmful  levels. To study  this phenomenon,  we decompose  total industrial
emissions  in a particular  region  as follows.
(1)P = rn(y)Qp(y)17(y)
where
P = Total  industrial  pollution
m - Manufacturing  share  of total output
Q  Total output
p =  Manufacturing  pollution  intensity
q=  Degree  of pollution  abatement:  0 <  r1 < 1
y  Income  per capita
Equation  (1) includes  three parameters  which  we hypothesize  to be functions  of economic
development:  The manufacturing  share  of total output (m), the pollution  intensity  of
manufacturing  (p), and  the degree  of pollution  abatement  by industry  (r1).  In this decomposition,
the effect  of economic  development  on pollution  depends  on the signs  and  the magnitudes  of the
parameters  governing  the relations  between  m, p, rj and y.
2.1 Manufacturing  Share  of Total  Output
Numerous  studies  of the relationship  between  industrialization  and economic  development
have suggested  an inverted-U  relationship  between  the manufacturing  share  of output (m)  and
4income  per capita  (y).
2 During  the first phase  of economic  growth,  m increases  as industry
expands  more  rapidly  than  agriculture. As  the economy  begins  to mature, rapid  growth  in
services  becomes  the dominant  factor and  m declines. Over  the existing  range  of national  incomes
per capita,  this relationship  can be approximated  with a parabolic  function:
.(2) logm  =  a0 + a1 logy +  aC 2(logy) 2 (a, > 0, a2 < 0)
Our empirical  analysis  uses  cross-country  evidence  for the past two decades  to estimate  this
relationship  and test its intertemporal  stability. We focus  particularly  on changes  in om/5y  as
development  proceeds. Controlling  for growth in total output,  large movements  in m will  have  a
significant  impact  on the trajectory  followed  by industrial  pollution.
2.2 Sector-Weighted  Pollution  Intensity
The sectoral  composition  of industrial  activity  has an important  effect  on its average  pollution
intensity,  or pollution  per unit of output. Industrial  processes  differ  greatly  in their production  of
waste  residuals  which, in turn, have  varying  potential  for creating  environmental  damage.
Abatement  costs also differ  significantly  by industry  sector (Dasgupta,  et. al. (1996),  Hartman,  et.
al., (1997)).  Even  in well-regulated  economies,  these  factors  cause significant  intersectoral
differences  in pollution  intensity. For example,  metals  and cement  are generally  intensive  in
harmful  air pollutants;  food and paper  production  are disproportionate  emitters  of organic  water
pollutants  (Hettige,  et. al. (1995)).
Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that the sectoral  composition  of industry  follows  a 'clean' trend
as development  proceeds.  This  could  reflect  domination  of early industrialization  by primary
industries,  which  generate  heavy  pollution  loads  as they convert  bulk raw materials  into primary
2  For  a discussion  of  structural  change  in  development,  see  Syrquin  (1989).
5inputs  (e.g. metals,  paper,  cement,  sugar).  During  the development  process, primary  industries
may  lose output share  to cleaner  industries  (e.g. vehicle  and  electronics  assembly,  instruments). 3
In this paper,  we test the clean  trend hypothesis  for industrial  water pollution  by fitting  the
following  equation  to an international  panel  dataset:




j, k, t 5  Country,  sector and year respectively
Pj  = Average  pollution  intensity  for sector  j (see Section  4.3)
2.3 Pollution  Abatement
The marginal  cost of abating  pollution  from  industrial  sources  is a function  of the scale  of
activity,  pollutant  concentration  in process  influent, 4 the degree  of abatement,  and local  input
prices. 5 In static  partial  equilibrium,  cost-minimizing  firms  with flexible  abatement  choices  will
control  pollution  to the point  where  their marginal  abatement  costs equal the 'price' exacted  for
pollution  by affected  parties. 6 Characteristic  production  scale and  process effluent  intensity  differ
3  See  Mani  and  Wheeler  (1997)  for  further  discussion.
4 .Influent'  refers  to  emissions  from  industrial  processes  before  treatment  (or  abatement);  'effluent'  refers  to
emissions  to  air,  water  or  land  after  treatnent;  'concentration'  refers  to the  quantity  of  pollutant  per  unit
volume  of  the  waste  stream.
5 For  recent  empirical  evidence,  see  Hartman,  et.  al.  (1997)  and  Dasgupta,  et.  al. (1996).
These  may.  according  to the  circumstances,  include  local  administrators,  pressure  groups,  national  regulators,
stockholders,  and 'green  consumers.'  Each  group  is in a position  to impose  some  cost  on  a firm  or plant  if its
emissions  exceed  the  norms  adopted  by  that  group.  Thus,  even  where  pollution  charges  are  in  effect,  there  is
no singlc  'price' of  pollution.  For  a detailed  discussion,  see  Afsah,  et.  al. (1996).
6significantly  by sector,  and abatement costs differ by location. Differences in the groups affected
by pollution can also lead to significant  spatial variation in emissions prices. 7
2.3.1  Pollution, Employment, Regulation and Input Prices
Where the environment  is 'cheaper' or abatement is more expensive, the pollution intensity of
production in a particular sector should be higher, ceteris paribus. However, data scarcity has
made it difficult  to test the magnitude of these effects, as well as the impact of spatial variation in
the prices of capital, labor, energy and materials.  At present, we have sufficient data to
investigate these relationships in a two-equation demand system: 8
in  P.=  ao  + E dS  R  j  KIn  WK+aL  In WL  +a  E In WE  +aM  InWMj+aQIn.Q
InP.  +  m-"PDP+R  Ka  +WKlL
InL.  = 0i+XfiSLDSL+JpPInR.+IKlnWK  +fILInWLj+fE  lnwEj  +lM lnwMj  +,Q  inQj
where (for country  j)
P = Plant-level pollution
L = Plant-level employment
D = Vector of dummy variables for S sectors
R = An index of regulatory strictness
WK,L,E.M  = Prices of capital, labor, energy and materials
Q  = Plant-level output
Our dataset, described in the following section, combines information from several sources:
plant- and sector-level data on emissions and employment from national and regional EPA's;
sector-level information  on output and employment from national census bureaus and the World
Bank's international database (BESD); and data from BESD on national income, population, and
7 For  recent  evidence,  see  Pargal  and Wheeler  (1996),  Wang  and  Wheeler  (1996),  and  Hettige,  et.  al. (1997).
8 Data-gathering  in this context  is not a simple task. Even  assembly  of the relatively  sparse  dataset  used for this
exercise  has  required  a massive  canvass  of World  Bank  project  files,  consultants'  reports,  and  emissions
reports  from  many  national  environmental  protection  institutions.  The  data  are  briefly  surveyed  in the
following  section,  with  a more  detailed  description  in the  Appendix.
7a number  of other variables. For cross-country  consistency,  we use summary  data  by sector. 9
Plant-level  relations  between  scale (Q) and pollution  intensity  (P/Q) are not relevant  for sectoral
aggregates,  so we impose  the assumption  of constant returns  (aQ = /IQ =  1).1o  This implies
estimation  of the pollution  and labor  equations  in intensity  form,  with P/Q and L/Q as the
dependent  variables.
Using  the BESD database,  we estimate  sectoral  average  L/Q ratios  for each sample  country.
We construct  sectoral  average  P/L ratios  (sectoral  pollution  intensities  w.r.t. labor)  from the data
provided  by national  and regional  EPA's. We estimate  PIQ (pollution  intensity  w.r.t. output)  by
multiplying  L/Q and P/L for each  sector and  country. The results  permit  us to estimate  the
following  equations:
P.
(5)  InOJ=0  5SPSP  +RInR.+KInWK  +aLIn  L  +aEn  WE  +C.
L 
In  0  g flSLDSL  +6P In Rj  +fl6  In WK.  +AL  In WLj  + flE  In  WEj  + vj
In some  cases,  we have  clear prior expectations  about parameter  signs:
Regulation: Ceteris  paribus,  we expect  stricter regulation  to have  a negative  impact  on
pollution  intensity. We have  no clear prior about its impact  on labor  intensity  at the sector level.
Labor  Price: We naturally  expect  increasing  wages  to reduce  the labor  intensity  of
industrial  output. The effect  of wages  on pollution  intensity  is less  transparent. Econometric
estimates  of KLEM  (capital,  labor,  energy,  materials)  models  has suggested  that (K,E) and (L,M)
See Appcndix  I for a description  of dala sources  in each country.
to Marginal  abatement  costs  declinc  with  treatment  scale  for most pollutants,  because  abatement  capital is lumpy.
Thus, the estimated  output  clasticity  of emnissions  in a plant-level  equation  is generally  less  than one. For
cvidence  from Asia, see  Pargal and Wheeler  (1996). At the sectoral  level,  however,  the constant-returns
assumption  seems  appropriate  for cross-country  work. It is possible  that characteristic  plant scale  is larger in
countries  with greater sectoral  output, but we have no way to test this proposition  with the available  data.
8are complements  in production, while the pairs KE and LM are gross substitutes." 1 If these
relations hold, a wage increase should have the following effects on emissions:
(1) Materials use and the volume of polluting residuals should decline;
(2) Labor use should decrease in both processing and pollution abatement activities, with some
increase in pollution from the latter effect.  However, our prior expectation is that the materials-
reducing effect should dominate: A wage increase should reduce water pollution intensity.
Energy Price:  If labor and energy are gross substitutes in production, then an increase in
the price of energy should increase the labor intensity of production.  In the case of pollution, an
energy price increase will reduce energy use for both processing and pollution abatement.
Abatement activity should therefore fall, and water pollution intensity should rise.
Capital Price:  A capital price increase should also increase labor intensity. For pollution,
an increase  in the interest  rate or the price  of equipment  should  reduce  capital  and energy  use as
well  as pollution  abatement,  while  increasing  the use of labor and materials  in processing.  Both
reduced  abatement  and increased  materials  use should  lead  to more  water pollution.
2.3.2  Pollution Intensity and Economic Development
Regulatory strictness and some input prices (e.g., wages) change systematically  as per capita
income  increases. To assess  the overall  impact  of economic  development,  we also estimate  our
intensity  equations  in reduced form:
p .
(6)  In  J  =  P = Yo  +  2  5SpDsp +P,  In y + j
Qi  ~~s
L .
In Q] = A} = ro  + E YSLDSL tYy In  y + v}
These  equations  have  two specific  roles to play  in our analysis. First,  they  provide  an
estimate of py,  the elasticity of end-of-pipe pollution intensity with respect to income per capita.
We use this to construct the index il in Equation (1).  The results also provide estimates of
5 See Christensen, et al. (1973).
9average  sectoral  pollution  intensities  (8sp)  across  countries. We combine  these intensities  with
our panel  data on sector shares  by country  to construct  estimates  of p for use in Equation  (3).
3.  DATA
3.1 Industrial  Pollution
To our knowledge,  this is the first comparative  international  study of industrial  pollution
which  uses  direct  observations  on emissions.  We have  obtained  the data from environmental
protection  agencies  in Brazil,  China,  Finland,  India, Indonesia,  Korea,  Mexico,  Netherlands,
Philippines,  Sri Lanka,  Taiwan  (China),  Thailand  and  the LJS.  Descriptions  of the data sources
are provided  in Appendix  I.
We use the pollution  information  and complementary  employment  data to estimate  emissions
intensities  by industry  sector in kilograms  per day per employee.  We focus  on organic  water
pollution  because  it provides  the most plentiful  and reliable  source  of comparable  cross-country
emissions  infornation. Water pollution  data are the most plentiful  because  developing  countries
have  traditionally  begun  industrial  pollution  control  programs  with regulation  of organic  water
emissions. They  are relatively  reliable  because  sampling  techniques  for measuring  water pollution
are more  widely  understood  and much  less  expensive  than  those for air pollution.
3.2 Environmental  Regulation
Some  comparable  measure  of regulatory  strictness  is necessary  for estimation  of our cross-
country  equations. However,  credible  indices  of environmental  regulation  are difficult  to find.
Even  in the US, comparative  analyses  of state-level  regulatory  'outputs' have generally  used
input-based  measures  such as expenditures  on monitoring  and enforcement,  or total employment
10of inspectors.  12 Such measures  may  have  at least some  justification  for within-country  analyses,
since  quality-  and price-adjustment  problems  are not too serious. For international  comparisons,
however,  they  would  be problematic  even  if comparable  data were available. Most developing
countries  do not have such  data, so input-based  comparisons  are not possible  in any  case.
A more promising  approach  has been taken by recent  econometric  work on the sources  of
variation  in regulatory  strictness.  This work is helping  to identify  robust  proxies  which  can be
used as instruments  in cross-country  comparisons.  The best instrument  is undoubtedly  per capita
income,  which  has been shown  to affect  both formal  and informal  regulatory  pressure  on polluters
in the US and  Asia  (McConnell  (1992),  Pargal and Wheeler  (1996),  Hartman,  et. al. (1997),
Hettige,  et. al. (1996)  and Wang  and Wheeler  (1996)). Dasgupta  et. al. (1995) have  advanced
the state of the art by developing  quantitative  indices  of regulatory  development  from reports  filed
for the U.N. Conference  on Environment  and Development  (UNCED  - Rio de Janeiro, 1992).
Their  results  suggest  that international  differences  in pollution  regulation  are well-explained  by a
model  which  incorporates  the effects  of per capita  income,  urbanization,  population  density,  and
manufacturing  share  in national  output. We have  adopted  the Dasgupta  model  to produce  a
cross-country  pollution  regulation  index  for this paper.  Six  of our thirteen  country  cases  have
actually  been  scored  by the Dasgupta  exercise. For the remaining  seven  cases,  we have
calculated  the pollution  regulation  index  values  using  the Dasgupta  equation.
12  See  for  example  Levinson  (1994)  and  Beede  (1993).
113.3 Input prices
We have computed wages (in $US 1990 per worker) by ISIC sector from UNIDO's reported
sectoral totals for employment and payrolls. Our electricity tariff rates for the OECD and
developing countries have been drawn from International Energy Agency data and the World
Bank's Power Sheets database, respectively.  The World Bank's World Development Indicators
database has provided our national real interest rate measures.
3.4  Employment, Income and Output
Estimation of equations (2), (3), (5) and (6) requires cross-country data on total output,
industrial output, employment, income, population and a number of other variables. We have
obtained the relevant panel data from the World Bank's international database (BESD).  We have
used Summers-Heston estimates as our measure of income per capita.
4.  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
4.1  Manufacturing Share in National Output
Table 4.1 reports panel estimates for equation (2). We provide comparable results for OLS,
fixed-effects (without time dummies) and random effects -models. We prefer the random effects
model, but the choice of estimator does not have a major effect on the results.  They are
consistent with an inverted-U model for manufacturing share in national output.  Our results also
suggest some structural change in the relationship, since the interactions of time with income and
income squared both satisfy classical  significance  criteria.  During the past two decades, the
'inverted-U' appears to have steepened somewhat and shifted downward.
To illustrate  the implied  relationship,  we have  calculated  median  manufacturing  shares  by
income class for all 1,717 observations in our sample.  The result (Figure 4.1) suggests that
12manufacturing  share  rises steeply  with income  until  a country  reaches  middle-income  status;' 3
from around 10%  in countries  with less  than $1000  per capita  (Summers-Heston  income,  in $US
1990)  to around  25% in countries  with incomes  of $5,000-$6,000. Then  the manufacturing  share
slowly  declines  to around 20% in countries  with $20,000  or more.
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4.2 Changes  in Sectoral  Composition
Table  4.2 reports results  for our analysis  of changes  in sectoral  composition.  We have
employed  panel  techniques  to estimate  Equation  (3) in log-log  formn,  using  the log of share-
weighted  average  BOD  intensity  as the dependent  variable. Again,  the fixed-effects  and  random-
effects  estimates  tell the same  story:  As  income  per capita  increases, overall  pollution  intensity
declines  because  relatively  'clean' sectors  grow  more  quickly. However,  our results  suggest  that
3  we have  smoothed  the series  with  a three-interval  moving  average:  Each  share  observation  on the  graph  is the
average  for  the  previous,  corresponding,  and  succeeding  income  groups.
13the rate of decline also decreases.  We find no evidence ol'a structural change, except for a very
slight (but significant)  upshift in compositional pollution intensity.
In Figure 4.2, we provide an illustration of the relationship between overall pollution intensity
and income during the sample period. 
14 The figure is based on median values of overall intensity
for each income group in the set of 2,210 observations.  It suggests that sector-weighted average
water pollution intensity declines from nearly 6 Kg. to 4Kg. Per $US 1 million  per day, or about
30%, as income increases to around $5,000 per capita. Then it remains approximately stable over
the higher-income range.
Figure 4.2  Industrial BOD Intensity vs. Income Per Capita
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14 We  have  also  used  three-interval  smoothing  for  Figure  4.2. See  Footnote  13.
144.3  End-of-Pipe Pollution Intensity
Tables 4.3 - 4.5 report cross-country regression results for Equations (5) and (6).  We use
dummy variables to control for sectoral differences in average poflution intensity; dummy variable
controls are also introduced for national differences in reporting procedures and measures of
organic water pollution. The majority of environmental protection agencies (EPA's) have
reported emissions  of biological oxygen demand (BOD), which is a measure of oxygen removal
from water by bacteria which are oxidizing organic materials.  However,  three EPA's - for
China, Netherlands and Taiwan (China) - have reported COD (chemical oxygen demand).  COD
incorporates the effect of other pollutants on the rate of oxidization; it is systematically  larger than
BOD measures.
We have controlled for the measurement problem by introducing a dummy variable for COD-
based emissions  reports.  As expected, the estimated COD dummy is positive, large and highly
significant  in all pollution intensity equations.  Our sectoral dummy  variable results are also in
accord with prior expectations:  Food and Paper have the highest average organic water pollution
intensities; Metals and Mineral Products have the lowest.  In the case of labor intensity, Textiles,
Food  and Wood Products are highest (along with Other Manufacturing, the numeraire sector);
Metals and Chemicals  are the lowest.
We have also controlled for the possible impact of differences in emissions reporting
procedures. In several cases (China, India, Indonesia, Netherlands, Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Taiwan (China), Thailand)  the plant-level information provided by the EPA's  includes
employment  data.  This has enabled us to estimate sectoral pollution/labor ratios directly from the
EPA data.  In the other cases (Brazil, Finland, Korea, Mexico and the US), the EPA's  have
provided summary  pollution data by sector.  We have obtained summary employment data by
15sector from other national or regional sources, and have used the two summaries  to calculate
sectoral pollution/labor ratios.
We recognize the possibility  of systematic differences in the results generated by these two
approaches.  EPA's in developing countries focus on large polluters, so the average pollution
intensity of these facilities will be reflected in estimates based on plant samples. The situation is
potentially quite different when EPA-reported sectoral emissions are divided by census-reported
sectoral employment. Plants which ignore pollution regulations (and whose reported pollution is
therefore zero) may nevertheless be registered in an employment census. This might impart a
downward bias to summary-based intensities. In addition, all five countries for which we employ
summary data  (Brazil, Finland, Korea, Mexico, US) are in the middle or high income category.
Thus, failure to control for the sampling difference might also produce a downward bias in the
estimated effect of income or wages on pollution intensity.
We have introduced a dummy variable to control for this difference,  but it is not significant  in
our regressions.  In fact, we are not overly surprised by this result because effective coverage of
industrial facilities by both census-takers and regulators is a ftinction of development.  15
4.3.1  The Effects of Pollution Regulation and Relative Input Prices
As expected, the estimated wage-elasticity of labor intensity is large (around -.70) and highly
significant.  The wage elasticity of pollution intensity is also negative, large (-1.71) and highly
significant.  In the pollution intensity equation, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that
15 Both approaches  may underestimate  'true' sectoral  pollution  intensities  in developing  countries,  because
e.xisting  research  suggests  that medium  and large plants have  lower  pollution  per unit of output  than smaller
facilities  (ceteris  paribus). Sincc  smaller  plants are covered  by regulators  in developed  econonies, our
econometric  result may  actually  understate  the effect  of income  on pollution  intensity. We accept  the
plausibility  of this hypothesis.  but we have  no way to test it at present.
16labor and pollution are complements in production.  However, the converse is not true.  Our
index of regulatory strictness is not significant  in the labor intensity equation.
While the latter result is not particularly surprising, we also find that our regulatory strictness
index is not significant  in pollution intensity regressions which control for wages.  Does this
imply that market forces alone drive pollution, and that regulation is irrelevant?  Although our
results are consistent with this interpretation, we reject it for several reasons.  First, our wage and
regulation variables are highly  collinear because they are both correlated with per capita income.
As Table 4.4 shows, each variable is significant  in equations which exclude the other.  Second, a
large body of empirical work suggests that industrial pollution is responsive to pressure from local
communities  (Pargal and Wheeler, 1996; Hettige, et. al., 1997, Hartman, et. al., 1996), as well as
formal regulation. Both  forms of regulation are strongly affected by income, reflecting
increasing preferences for environmental  quality and higher valuation of  pollution damage. We
believe that the estimated wage elasticity in our pollution intensity regression is capturing cross-
country income effects on formal and informal regulation, as well as the effect of complementarity
with pollution in production.  With currently-available  information, we cannot distinguish  clearly
between these two effects. However, their joint effect clearly shows the impact of rising income
on pollution intensity.
Our results for energy and capital prices are considerably weaker.  Surprisingly, neither
variable  is significant in the labor intensity equation when both are included.  In the pollution
intensity regression,  the estimated electricity  price elasticity is positive, large and highly
significant. The real interest rate elasticity is also positive, and close to significance  at the 5%
level.  However, these results are not robust to changes in right-hand variables or sample
composition. Dropping the real interest rate increases the sample size, because we do not have
17real interest rate data for Mexico, Brazil and Taiwan (China).  However, with the larger sample
the electricity  price elasticity loses significance  in the pollution intensity equation, while becoming
large, negative, and highly 'significant' in the labor intensity equation.  We conclude that our
results for capital and energy prices are highly sensitive  to outliers, and we see no reason to draw
any clear conclusions from our results.
4.3.2  Economic Development and Pollution Intensity
We have also estimated reduced-form intensity equations which control for per capita
income, sector and COD reporting.  The results are summarized  in Table  4.5 for three intensities:
labor/output, pollution/output and pollution/labor. In all three equations, the results for the
sectoral dummies  replicate the pattern of results in Tables 4.3-4.4.  As before, the dummy variable
for COD is positive and significant  in the pollution equations.
The results for per capita income suggest a striking regularity across countries.  The income
elasticities  of pollution/output and labor/output are both negative, and not significantly  different
from one.  In the third equation, we test for the equality of pollution and labor elasticities (w.r.t.
income) by regressing pollutionAabor on the same set of right-hand variables (this amounts to
differencing  the coefficients in the first two equations).  Te  resulting elasticity of
pollution 'labor  with respect to income per capita is not significantly different from zero.  Of
course, we cannot generalize from one sample for one pollutant to all industrial emissions.
However,  for industrial water pollulion, our results suggest that sectoral emissions/labor ratios
Lare  approximately constant across countries at all income levels.  Developing economies
generate much more pollution per unit of output than developed economies, but they also employ
much more labor per unit of output, and in the same proportion.
18Figure 4.3 and Table 4.6 portray the estimated relationship between pollution intensity (per
unit of output) and income per capita.  For ease of interpretation, we normalize to an intensity
value of 100 for the poorest income category ($500 per capita).  The cross-country evidence
suggests a sharp drop in pollution intensity with income growth, as manufacturers respond to
higher wages and regulatory pressures with end-of-pipe abatement and process change. From an
emissions irdex value of 100 at $500 per capita, pollution abatement is about 60% at $1,500,
80% at $3,000, 90% at $7,000 and 95% at $15,000.
Table 4.6:  Income and Pollution Abatement
Income  %
















0  2000  4000  6000  8000  10000  12000  14000  16000  18000  20000
Per Capita  Income  ($US)
195.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS
5.1  The Kuznets Hypothesis
Our estimation exercises have suggested three distinct patterns of response to economic
development. Industry's share of national output rises sharply through middle-income  status and
then slowly declines. Sectoral composition follows a 'clean' trend for low-income developing
countries, but exhibits little or no trend beyond the middle income range.  End-of-pipe pollution
intensity, by contrast, declines continuously with income.
We use simulation  to project the net result of changes in these three factors.  Our four
simulation variables are in columns 1-4 of Table 5.1.  Column 1 includes a broad range of
incomes, from $US 500 to $US 20,000 per capita.  Columns 2 and 3 replicate the information on
manufacturing output shares and average pollution intensities in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.  Column 4
reproduces the pollution intensity index in Figure 4.3,  re-normalized to one for the lowest income
level.
We assume a unit population for convenience, so income per capita also serves as a measure
of total output.  We simulate  the overall relationship between economic development and
industrial pollution by multiplying  the four column entries in each row. The result combines the
effects of changes in total output, manufacturing share, sectoral composition, and end-of-pipe
pollution intensity. Column 5 and Figure 5.1 portray the total pollution estimate, which has been
normalized to an index value of 100 at the lowest income level.  Our result suggests that the
inverted U-shaped story is only half right for industrial water pollution: Total emissions rise
sharply in the range [$500 - $7,000], but remain constant as income increases further.
20Figure 5.1  Industrial Pollution and Economic Development
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To assess the contribution of each factor to the overall result, we perforn three
counterfactual simulations which are tabulated in columns 6-8 and illustrated in Figure 5.2  Each
simulation  allows one of columns 2-4 to vary while holding the other two constant at the lowest-
income level.  The experiment in column 6 holds sectoral composition and end-of-pipe pollution
intensity constant, while allowing the share of manufacturing to vary with income. The result is
rapid growth of pollution over the whole income range, and an estimated pollution load at
$20,000 which is eighty times the initial load. To produce column 7, we allow sectoral
composition to vary while holding the other two factors constant.  Pollution growth is
considerably moderated by comparison with column 6, but the projected load at $20,000 is still 40
times the initial load.  Finally, we test the effect of end-of-pipe change in column 8.  This
experiment clearly identifies  the most important factor:  Projected emissions at $20,000 are only
I .8 times the initial load, if manufacturing share and sectoral composition are held constant.
21We conclude that pollution levels off in the middle income range because end-of-pipe
pollution intensity responds to rising wages and stricter regulation.  By comparison, the
manufacturing share and sectoral composition are minor players. For industrial water pollution,
the inverted-U pattern does not emerge because declining pollution intensity almost exactly
balances output growth, while manufacturing share and sectoral composition remain constant
beyond the middle income range.
Figure  5.2:  Counterfactual  Simulations
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5.2 Trends  in International  Emissions
To explore the real-world implications  of our results, we estimate pollution loads for a set of
large industrial economies during the period 1977 - 1989.  Powerful leverage is provided by our
finding  that sectoral pollution per unit of labor (PIL) remains approximately constant across the
entire range of incomes.  This allows us to use commonly-available  sectoral labor/output (LIQ)
ratios to predict international changes in industrial water pollution.  As an illustration, we use the
World Bank's BESD database to estimate sectoral L/Q ratios for fifteen countries during the
22period 1977-1989. To estimate BOD loads by sector, we multiply  the L/Q ratios by sectoral P/L
coefficients calculated from our regression results for P/L.i6
We have chosen the fifteen countries to represent large industrial economies in four major
groups:  OECD (represented by the US, Japan, France and Germany (former F.R.);  the NIC's
(Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, Korea, South Africa, Turkey); Asian LDC's (China, India, Indonesia);
and the ex-COMECON countries (Poland, former USSR).  The results are tabulated in Table 5.3
(Appendix II) and summarized in Table 5.2 below.  Taken together, they illustrate the main
implications  of our empirical analysis.
In the OECD, despite modest continued economic growth, estimated BOD emissions  remain
almost constant.  In our view, this reflects the countervailing effects of output growth and
increases in wages and regulation; manufacturing shares and the 'clean' sector share change very
little. The COMECON economies are in relative stagnation during the sample period, so there is
little movement in their estimated emissions.
The story for the NIC's is quite different. Their estimated pollution increases by about 25%
during the sample period - substantially  less than their growth in per capita income.  The increase
is relatively  moderate because rapid output growth is offset by three factors: the negative impact
of increased wages and regulation on industrial pollution intensity; the first stage of the decline in
manufacturing share; and the last stage of the 'clean' trend in sectoral composition.
The Asian LDC experience is also distinctive. Estimated BOD emissions grow by
approximately 55% in these lower-income economies, because rapid output growth and
16 For this application,  we regress  log (P/L)  on dummy  variables  for COD  and the industry  sectors. Since income
is insignificant,  we  impose  a parameter  value  of zero  by dropping  it from the equation. To calculate  sectoral
P/L ratios,  we  assume  the BOD case (COD=O),  add the constant  term  to the estimated  parameters  for  the
sector  dummies,  and calculate  the antilogs  of the results.
23increasing  manufacturing  share  dominate  the clean  compositional  trend and the first effects  of
rising  wages  and regulation  on pollution  intensity. To a striking  degree,  BOD growth in our
intemational  sample  is due to increased  emissions  in developing  Asia.
The overall  result  of these  changes  is a significant  shift  in group shares  of total pollution.
Table  5.2 shows  that the OECD  and COMECON  countries  drop significantly  in share;  the NIC's
increase  marginally;  and the Asian  LDC's  jump from 29% to 37% ofthe total.  Equally
impressive,  however, is the apparently  moderate  growth in total BOD  emissions  during  the
period when  world concern  over environmental  damage  was reaching  a peak. While  economic
development  was sparking  greater  interest  in pollution,  is was also setting  the stage for real
improvements  in environmental  performance.  From 1977  to 1989,  we estimate  that total
industrial  BOD  emissions  grew  by only 16%  in these fifteen  major  industrial  countries.
Table 5.2: Trends in International Emissions:
Selected Countries, 1977  - 1989
l____  _ BOD  Emissions  ('000  Kg./Dv)
Region  1977  1980  1983  1986  1989
OECD  5,776  5,847  5,501  5,403  5,523
NIC's  1,565  1,917  1,848  2,19'7  2,188
ASIN  LDC'S  4,617  5,030  5,566  6,183  6,883
COMECON  4,127  4,218  4,302  4,228  4,039
TOTAL  16,085  17,012  17,217  18,011[  18,633
%  of Sample Total
1977  1980  1983  1986  1989
OECD  36  34  32  30  30
NIC's  10  11  11  12  12
ASIAN LDC'S  29  30  32  34  37
COMECON  26  25  25  23  22
TOTAL  100  100  100  100  100
246.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper,  we have  used new  international  data to investigate  the relationship  between
industrial  pollution  and economic  development. To test for a Kuznets  effect,  we measure  the
effect  of income  growth on three proximate  determinants  of pollution: The share  of
manufacturing  in total output;  the sectoral  composition  of manufacturing;  and  the intensity  (per
unit of output)  of industrial  pollution  at the end-of-pipe. We find that the manufacturing  share
follows  a Kuznets-type  trajectory,  but the other two determinants  do not. Sectoral  composition
gets 'cleaner' through  middle-income  status  and then stabilizes.  At the end-of-pipe,  pollution
intensity  declines  strongly  with income. We attribute  part of this to stricter  regulation  as income
increases,  and partly  to pollution-labor  complementarity  in production.
Our results suggest  that income  elasticities  of both pollution-  and labor-intensity  are
approximately minus  one.  The remarkable implication  is that a sector 'spollution/labor ratio is
conistant across  countries  at all income  levels.  Our findings motivate  two illustrative  simulation
exercises. First, for a set of income  benchmarks,  we simulate  total pollution  by combining
representative  measures  of manufacturing  share  in output, sectoral  composition,  and end-of-pipe
pollution  abatement. We do not see  a Kuznets-type  story in the result, since  total pollution  rises
rapidly  through  middle-income  status  and remains  approximately  constant  thereafter. In three
counterfactual  experiments,  we assess  the relative  importance  of the three proximate
determinants.  Our results  highlight  the domninance  of end-of-pipe  reductions  as wages  and
regulation  increase  with  development.  The combined  influence  of changes  in manufacturing  share
and sectoral  composition  is lower  by almost  two orders  of magnitude.
Our second  simulation  uses  international  panel data to explore  the implications  of constant
sectoral  pollution/labor  ratios.  We estimate  recent trends in water pollution  for fifteen  major
25industrial nations in the OECD, the NIC's, Asian LDC's and the ex-COMECON economies.  We
find approximately stable emissions in the OECD and ex-COMECON, moderate increases in the
NIC's and rapidly-growing pollution in the Asian LDC's.  During the 1980's, our estimates
suggest that the latter group displaced the major OECD economies as the world's largest
generator of organic water pollution. Overall, however, the negative feedback from economic
development  to pollution intensity was sufficient to hold total world pollution growth to around
15% during a twelve-year sample period.
In closing, it is worth asking whether these results are cause for optimism or pessimism.  The
appropriate answer seems to be 'both.'  It is comforting to see that industrial water emissions
level off in richer economies because pollution intensity has an elastic response to income growth.
Unfortunately, unitary elasticity implies that total emissions remain constant unless other factors
intervene. Of course, industry tends to deconcentrate over time as infrastructure improves and
prosperity spreads.  Constant total emissions may therefore be consistent with improving water
quality in at least some areas.  However, the continued existence of many seriously-polluted
waterways, even in the most prosperous countries, suggests that economic development remains
far short of a Kuznets-style happy ending in the water sector.
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29Appendix I: DATA SOURCES
Brazil: The water pollution  data for the Sao  Paulo  Metropolitan  region  of Brazil  were collected
by CETESB,  the environmental  agency  for Sao  Paulo State. Our pollution  estimates  are based  on
CETESB's  1250-plant  database,  which  includes  measures  of BOD loads  in kg/day.  The
corresponding  employment  data cane from the Sao  Paulo State Ministry  of Labor,  which
provided  2-digit  sectoral  information  from 1991  on nearly  41,000 plants  and 2.15 million  workers.
China: Water  pollution  data for China  were obtained  from the National  Environmental  Protection
Agency  (NEPA),  which  maintains  a comprehensive  database  on major sources  of industrial
pollution  in China. Our estimates  are based  on NEPA's 1993 emissions  data for 269 factories
scattered  throughout  China.
Finland: The Finnish  economic  data, aggregated  at the 3-digit  ISIC level,  were provided  by the
Central  Statistical  Office,  covering  both white  and blue  collar  workers  for 1989. The pollution
data were provided  by the Industrial  Waste  Water Office  of the National  Board of Waters  and  the
Environment.  They  cover water emissions  in 1992  from 193  large  water-polluting  factories.
India: The India  data are from  the state of Tamil  Nadu. Plant-level  pollution  data and
employment  data for 1993-94  were provided  by the Tamil  Nadu Pollution  Control  Board, which
monitors  air and  water pollution  for all the manufacturing  units in the state.
Indonesia:  The Indonesia  data came  from  two different  soturces.  The plant-level  emissions  data
were provided  by BAPEDAL,  Indonesia's  National  Pollution  Control  Agency  in the Ministry  of
Environment.  The economic  data are from Indonesia's  Central Statistics  Bureau  (BPS).
Korea: Korean pollution  data were provided  by the National  Pollution  Control  Agency. They
cover  water emissions  by 13,504  facilities  in 1991. Complementary  employment  data have  been
drawn  from Korea's National  Statistical  Yearbooks  and the  LO's International  Labor
Statistics,  1991.
Mexico: Data  for water ernissions  in the Monterrey  Metropolitan  Area were provided  by the
State  Water  Monitoring  Authority. The data cover emissions  from 7,500  facilities  in 1994.
Complementary  employment  data were provided  by Mexico's Census  Bureau  (INEGI).
Netherlands:  Water  emissions  and employment  data for approximately  700 regularly-monitored
facilities  in 1990  were provided  by the Emissions  Inventory  System  maintained  by the Ministry  of
Housing,  Spatial  Planning  and the Environment  (VROM).
Philippines:  Water emissions  and employment  data for factories  in the Metro Manila  Area
(MMvIA)  were provided  the Philippines  Department  of Natural Resources  (DENR)  and  the Laguna
Lake Development  Authority.
30Taiwan (China): Water emissions  and employment  data for 1,800  plants  were provided  by the
Water  Quality  Protection  division  of the Taiwan  Environment  Protection  Agency.
Thailand:  Seatec  International,  a private-sector  environmental  consulting  firm  in Bangkok
provided  plant-level  data from  two industrial  estates  in Rangsit  and Suksawat. The dataset
contained  information  on water emissions  and employment  for approximately  450 facilities  in
1992.
Sri Lanka: Water  pollution  and employment  data for Sri Lanka  were obtained  from a study  of
waste water  treatment  options  for the Ekala/Ja-ela  Industrial  Estate, which  includes  143  industrial
establishments  with 21,000 employees.  The data were collected  by a joint project of the World
Bank's Metropolitan  Environment  Improvement  Program  and the Sri Lankan  Board of
Investment.  Ekala/Ja-Ela  industrial  estate  is one of the two major industrial  estates  in Sri  Lanka.
U.S.A.: The information  for the United  States  were drawn  from two main sources. The water
emissions  data have  been  collected  from regional  databases  which  monitor  industrial  water
discharges  as part of the U.S. Environmental  Protection  Agency's  NPDES system. Employment
data are from  the U.S. Census  Bureau's Longitudinal  Research  Database.
31Appendix  I:  Tables
Table 4.1:  Log (Manufacturing Share of Total Output) vs. Log (Income  Per Capita), 1975-1994*
Independent  OLS  Fixed  Random  OLS  Fixed  Random
Variables  Effects  Effects  _  Effects  Effects
Log Income  0.9195  0.5147  0.5726  1.3585  0.7719  0.9402
(2.483)  (1.815)  (2.076)  ('7.934)  (6.815)  (8.323)
Log Income squared  -0.0442  -0.04268  -0.0364  -0.0704  - -0.0622
-(1.796)  -(2.185)  -(1.923)  -(6.446)  0.05988  -(8.988)
_____  _ ___  ___ -(8.772)
Log Income * Time  0.07527  0.0450  0.0511
(1.993)  (3.126)  (3.456)  _
Log Income  squared  -0.0045  -0.0028  -0.0032
* Time  -(1.858)  -(3.154)  -(3.538)  _
Time  -0.3194  -0.1614  -0.1911  -0.0120  0.0146  0.0062
-(2.196)  -(2.762)  -(3.205)  -(4.224)  (6.612)  (3.190)
Constant  -6.1460  -3.3256  4.074  -7.9373  4.2714  -5.3585
-(4.480)  -(3.254)  -(4.095)  -(12.013)  -(8.897)  -(11.415)
Number of  1136  1136  1136  1136  1136  1136
Observations  _
Number of Time  16  16  16  16  16  16
Periods  _
Adjusted R-squared  0.299  0.151  0.015  _0.297  0.171  0.003
* T-statistics  in parentheses
Table 4.2:  Log  (Sector-Weighted  BOD Intensity) vs. Log (Income  Per Capita), 1975-1994*
Independent  OLS  Fixed  Random  OLS  Fixed  Random
Variables  Effects  Effects  _  Effects  Effects
Log Income  0.2846  -0.3903  -0.3709  -0.0236  -0.5362  -0.5283
(1.018)  -(3.566)  -(3.427)  -(0.184)  -(12.719)  -(12.616)
Log Income  squared  -0.0234  0.01749  0.0164  -0.0019  0.0269  0.0267
-(1.321)  (2.459)  (2.344)  -(0.249)  (11.050)  (10.974)
Log Income * Time  -0.0117  -0.00736  -0.0071  ***  ***
-(0.416)  -(1.214)  -(1.171)  _
Log Income  squared  0.0009  0.0005  0.0004  _  **
* Time  (0.578)  (1.398)  (1.374)  __.
Time  0.03203  0.0319  0.0300  0.0034  0.0055  0.0051
(0.278)  (1.232)  (1.161)  (2.166)  (6.402)  (6.351)
Constant  0.6935  3.4369  3.3470  1.7679  3.9912  3.9435
(0.633)  (8.168)  (8.035)  (3.373)  (21.143)  (20.989)
Number of  928  928  928  928  928  928
Observations  _
Number of Time  16  16  16  16  16  16
Periods  _
Adjusted  R-squared  0.043  0.043  0.043  0.043  0.041  0.041
*  T-statistics in parentheses
32Table 4.3:  Intensity Equations  for Pollution and Labor (in Prices and Regulation)
Dep. Var. - Log. of:  Pollutionl  Polution/  Labor/  Laborl
_  _________  _o_  Output  utput  o  nO
Independent Variables  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat  Cod.  t-stat.
Log Wage  -1.714  -3.055**  -0.015  -0.044  -0.711  -8.473** -0.379  -6.380**
Log Brown Index  2.459  0.958  -2.995  -1.601  0.164  0.422  -1.467  -4.657**
Log Electricity Price  6.123  3.684**  0.620  0.526  -0.098  -0.580  -0.564  -3.354**
Log Real Interest  Rate  0.455  1.903*  0.029  0.872  _
COD  4.308  4.829**  2.406  2.559**
Food  5.658  5.044**  4.511  3.940** -0.571  -3.817** -0.813  -4.239**
Textiles  4.601  4.163**  3.932  3.449** -0.018  -0.125  -0.168  -0.881
Wood Products  3.717  2.775**  3.103  2.176**  -0.021  -0.140  0.053  0.280
Paper  6.864  6.102**  4.946  4.318** -0.151  -1.006  -0.231  -1.205
Chemicals  4.614  3.916**  3.236  2.785** -0.526  -3.320** -0.715  -3.669**
Non-Metallic  Minerals  1.290  1.118  1.023  0.879  -0.123  -0.823  -0.242  -1.263
Metals  2.312  1.910*  0.988  0.828  -0.697  -4.383** -0.771  -3.903**
Metal Products  3.538  3.063**  2.232  1.920*  -0.278  -1.842*  -0.502  -2.612**
|Constant  _-27.244  -2.466**  -0.702  -0.096  -5.253  -3.162**  1.933  1.479
Adjusted  R-square  0.63  0.34  0.92  0.81
Number of Observations  68  99  80  116
significant  at 1%  confidence  level
**  significant  at 5% confidence  level
*  significant  at 10%  confidence  level
33Table 4.4: Intensity Equations for Pollution and Labor (in Prices and Regulation)
Dep. Var. - Log of:  Pollution/  Labor/  Pollution/  Labor/
Output  Outpu  Output  Output
Independent Variables  Coef.  t-stat  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat
Log Wage  -1.211  -6.153  -0.666  -22.600
Log Brown index  _  -4.885  -5.052  -2.872  -14.642
Log Electricity  Price  5.634  3.565  -0.280  -1.223  3.765  2.384  -1.173  -3.871
Log Real Interest Rate  0.370  1.668  0.025  0.807  0.234  0.957  -0.058  -1.27
COD  4.375  4.923  -0.110  -0.852  4.125  4.32  -0.197  -1.071
Food  5.485  4.959  -0.585  -3.979  5.073  4.278  -0.792  -3.767
Textiles  4.586  4.153  -0.018  -0.124  4.556  3.842  -0.016  -0.074
Wood  Products  3.654  2.733  -0.028  -0.188  3.429  2.392  -0.131  -0.622
Paper  6.675  6.032  -0.167  -1.132  6.222  5.247  -0.396  -1.882
Chemicals  4.246  3.815  -0.558  -3.764  3.364  2.837  -1.023  -4.866
Non-Metallic  Minerals  1.114  0.979  -0.138  -0.941  0.681  0.558  -0.362  -1.720
Metal s  2.014  1.723  -0.722  4.729  1.243  0.999  -1.094  -5.045
Metal Products  3.323  2.935  -0.296  -2.011  2.784  2.299  -0.560  -2.661
Constant  -16.903 -7.208  -4.403  -13.734  3.324  0.661  7.522  7.83
Adjusted R-square  0.64  0.93  0.59  0.85
Number of  68  80  68  80
.Observations  _I=  _  I  _II  _  I
34Table 4.5: Intensity Equations for Pollution and Labor (in Income Per Capita)
Dep. Var. - Log of:-  Pollution/Output  Labor/Output  Pollution/Labor
Independent  variables  Coef.  t-stat  Coef.  t-stat  Coef.  t-stat
Log Income  -0.875  -3.26**  -1.003  |17.041**  0.120  0.449
COD  1.908  2.542**  1.930  2.576**
Food  4.629  4.096**  -0.925  -4.085**  5.492  4.868**
Textiles  4.055  3.588**  -0.150  -0.662  4.143  3.673**
Wood Products  3.315  2.350**  0.047  0.206  3.485  . 2.475**
Paper  5.064  4.481**  -0.350  -1.547  5.353  4.745**
chemical  3.349  2.963**  -0.957  -4.225**  4.244  3.762**
mineral  1.151  1.003  -0.361  -1.595  1.414  1.235
metal  1.119  0.962  -0.964  4.171**  2.038  1.786
metal products  2.367  2.071**  -0.635  -2.803**  2.983  2.615**
constant  -8.872  -3.615**  -1.497  -2.828**  -7.246  -2.972**
Adjusted  R-square  0.35  0.74  0.39
Number of  99  116  100
Observations
Table 5.1: Industrial Pollution and Economic  Development:
Simulation  Experiments
Income  Manuf.  BOD  EOP  Total  Variable  Variable  Variable
($US)  Share  Intens.  Intens.  BOD  Share  BOD  EOP
500  11.0  5.4  1.00  100  100  100  100
1,500  13.4  4.8  0.39  128  366  268  118
2,500  16.9  4.6  0.25  167  771  428  127
3,500  18.5  4.3  0.19  177  1,179  553  133
4,500  21.0  4.0  0.15  197  1,726  670  138
6,000  24.3  4.0  0.12  237  2,663  888  144
8,000  23.5  4.2  0.09  247  3,424  1,230  150
10,000  23.3  4.1  0.08  253  4,256  1,531  155
12,000  22.6  4.2  0.07  255  4,953  1,859  160
14,000  21.2  4.2  0.06  246  5,399  2,188  163
17,000  20.3  4.3  0.05  248  6,298  2,709  168
20,000  19.5  4.3  0.04  249  7,904  3,559  175
35Table  5.3: Estimated  Industrial  BOD Emissions
Selected  Countiies, 1977  - 1989 ('000 K&/]Day)
COUNTRY  1977  1980  1983  1986  1989
UTNED STATES  2,652  2,743  2,551  2,454  2,564
FRANCE  739  716  683  666  652
GERMANY  (FORIMER  FR)  929  932  800  789  8(0
JAPAN  1,456  1,456  1,467  1,493  1,507
OECD  5,776  5,847  5,501  5,403  5,523
BRAZIL  611  867  771  965  91L4
MEXICO  109  131  130  179  174
KOREA,  REPUBLIC  OF  261  282  296  345  377
TAIWAN,  CHINA  208  239  252  296  282
SOUTIH  AFRICA  226  238  245  245  262
TURKEY  150  160  155  167  17'9
NIC's  1,565  1,917  1,848  2,197  2,188
CH[NA  3,118  3,358  3,957  4,551  5,023
INDIA  1,309  1,457  1,380  1,277  1,428
INDONESIA  190  214  230  355  433
DEVELOPING  ASIA  4,617  5,030  5,566  6,183  6,883
POLAND  578  581  546  484  459
U.S.S.R.,  FORMER  3,549  3,638  3,756  3,744  3,580
EX-COMECON  4,127  4,218  4,302  4,228  4,039
TOTAL  16,085 17,012 17,217 18,011 18,633
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